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Abstract 
Since 1950, the quantity of working hours has been decreasing over time both in the 
U.S. and in the main European economies. The European economies have started this 
mutual decline process with longer working hours than in the U.S., but have ended it 
with less working hours than the U.S. This article presents a model in which this 
dynamic pattern for the joint dynamics of their working hours is shared by two 
economies that differ only in the weight that their individuals put on leisure in their 
utility function and are identical in every other respect. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 1950, working hours have been decreasing in both the U.S. and the U.K. During 
this mutual decline the working hours in the U.K., that initially were higher than in 
the U.S., have become lower than in the US. Figure 1 presents this "Backslanted X" 
dynamic pattern that prevails also when the U.S. is not paired with the U.K. but with 
almost each of the other main European economies.1 In addition, this pattern is also 
robust to changes in the particular measures of working hours being used. 
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Figure 1: Working hours in the UK and the US., 1950-2000. Data sourse: ILO 
database. 
 
 Trying to account for this phenomenon, Prescott (2004) calibrates a dynamic 
model of investment and labor supply and concludes that the differences in the U.S. 
labor supply and those of the European economies can be almost fully explained by 
differences in marginal income tax rates. Alessina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, when labor hours are measured by their annual total this pattern is observed when the US 
is paired with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden Switzerland 
and the U.K.. When working hours are measured by the weekly working hours of full-time workers (a 
measure much less sensitive to unemployment) Italy too joins this least. See Tables 1 in Huberman and 
Minns (2007). 
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criticize Prescott's result, and particularly its reliance on assumptions that lead to an 
unrealistically high elasticity of labor supply. They offer another explanation to the 
differences between U.S. and Europe's labor hours, one that builds on cross-country 
differences in unions power.  The unions effect on hours is spread throughout the 
economy due to the existence of a social multiplier in preferences that makes people 
want to enjoy their leisure together. Another related article is Blanchard (2004) who 
analyzes France and U.S. data and concludes that the decline in working hours in 
France is the outcome of growth in productivity “with part of that increase allocated 
to increased income and part to increased leisure” (page 5). He too criticizes the high 
elasticity of labor supply in Prescott (2004) and in attending to the question of “how 
much of this change comes from preferences and increasing income and how much 
comes from increasing tax distortions,” (page 9) he claims that the data suggests a 
greater importance for the role of preferences. A similar approach is taken by 
Huberman and Minns (2007). Looking at the evolution of labor hours in the U.S. and 
Europe not only in recent decades but since 1870, they show that during the recent 
decades the joint dynamics of the U.S. and Europe working hours have been repeating 
the same course they took more than a 100 years ago. This leads them to the 
conclusion that the underlying reasons for the observed cross-country differences are 
deep-seated and time invariant factors like religion, legal origin or climate, rather than 
current cross-country differences in tax-rates, union power and other labor market 
institutions.  
 Motivated by the approach of the latter two articles, the purpose of this paper 
is to construct a theoretical model in which a difference in preferences towards leisure 
between economies indeed generates a “Backslanted X” pattern of their working 
hours dynamics. Specifically, the model is used to look at two economies, identical in 
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their initial period stocks and in all of their parameters except for a difference in the 
weight assigned to leisure in the utility function of their individuals. At first, due to 
the identical initial conditions, the individuals in the country with the greater weight 
on leisure (“country A” henceforth) are enjoying more leisure than those in the other 
country (“country B” henceforth). However, country B individuals, who work more, 
are enjoying greater incomes and therefore are able to invest more. This leads to a 
phase where the cross-country income gap is so large that country B individuals work 
less than their country A counterparts – despite the utility differences. However, 
although at a slower rate, country A is growing too and at a certain stage the income 
gap between the two countries starts to narrow due to diminishing returns to the 
investment in physical and human capital. Eventually, the income gap is sufficiently 
narrowed to make the country A's greater weight on leisure regain its dominancy over 
the income gap in determining which is the country with the lower working hours 
among the two.  
 The dynamics described above do not contain just the “Backslanted X” shape 
from figure 1. In fact they also contain an initial stage in which labor time in country 
A is smaller than in B. Indeed, figure 2 shows that already in 1870 labor hours in the 
U.K. were less in the U.S. This gap narrowed over time and in 1929 the labor hours in 
the U.S. fall below those of the U.K., a situation that prevails until the 1970s. As with 
figure 1, this dynamic pattern is also seen when the U.S. is paired with almost each of 
the other main European economies, and when different measures of working hours 
are used. 
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Figure 2: Working hours in the UK and the US., 1870-2000. Data sourse: ILO 
database. 
 
According to the dynamics of the model, the country whose individuals put a 
lower weight on leisure in their utility, country B, is richer and has more educated 
than country A. These features of the model indeed have a hold in reality when the 
U.S. is compared with European countries. As Maddison (2006) shows, the Per-capita 
GDP of the U.S. was higher than any in European country for more than a 100 years 
now. Goldin (2001) Shows that in the mid-1950s secondary school enrollment was 
around 80% in the U.S., and less than 40% in each of the European countries.  
Accounting for different economic outcomes by the cultural differences 
between societies is an approach that dates back at least a hundred years to Webber's 
1904 classical study tying the spirit of capitalism to the Protestant ethic. Weil (2004) 
offers a detailed survey on the vast literature on the relations between economic 
growth and culture that has developed since then. 
 Section 2 presents the model and section 3 uses the model for showing how 
the desired dynamic pattern can emerge when two countries differ only in the weight 
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their individuals put on the utility from leisure. Section 4 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is based on incorporating an endogenous leisure choice into a simplified 
version of the model of education choice presented by Hazan and Berdugo (2002). 
Consider a closed, perfectly competitive, overlapping-generations economy. Time is 
infinite and discrete.  
 
2.1 Production 
In every period the economy produces a single good that can be used for either 
consumption or investment. Two factors of production exist in the economy: physical 
capital and efficiency units of labor. The production function is given by: 
 
  Qt = AKtαLt1-α = Aktα         (1) 
 
Where Qt, Kt and Lt are the period t amounts of output, physical capital and labor 
efficiency units in the economy, respectively and kt ≡ Kt/Lt. Due to the competitive 
environment production factors are paid their marginal productivity. Specifically, in 
each period t the payments for each efficiency unit of labor and each unit of physical 
capital, denoted respectively by wt and Rt, satisfy: 
 
  wt = (1 - α)Aktα        (2) 
 
and:  
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  Rt = α
α
−1
tk
A
         (3) 
 
2.2 Individuals 
In each period t a generation of individuals is born and lives for three periods. The 
size of each generation is equal to 1. Each individual has a single parent. Individuals 
within a generation are identical in their preferences. A generation born at a certain 
period t–1 is denoted “generation t”. In each period each individual is endowed with a 
single time unit 
In their first life period (t–1), the members of generation t are children. The 
parent of each such child allocates a fraction denoted by τt-1 of the child’s time to 
schooling.  
In their second life period (t), the members of generation t are adults. They 
work, raise children, consume and save. Each individual is assumed to have exactly 
one child. Each such individual divides her time unit between leisure and working, 
where the term “leisure” captures time consuming activities other than participating in 
the production process. The amount of labor efficiency units each member of 
generation t has in that period is denoted et and is an increasing function of the 
amount of schooling this individual has received as a child. Specifically: 
 
  et = (1 + bτt-1)a,        (4) 
 
where a, b > 0. Thus, if a member of generation t allocates her entire period t time to 
working she will earn the amount It, given by: 
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  It ≡ etwt = (1 + bτt-1)awt.       (5) 
 
In each period t each member of generation t pays an education cost for the τt units of 
education purchased for her offspring. This cost is assumed to be a positive function 
of It reflecting thus both salaries for teachers and forgone parent's income as they 
invest part of their time in the education process.2 Specifically, the education cost is 
assumed to be τthIt output units, where h is a positive constant. 
 In their final life period (t + 1), the members of generation t consume their 
savings.  
As in Galor and Weil (2000) the motivation for investment in education 
springs from assuming that parents derive utility from their offspring potential income 
as adults. In addition, individuals are assumed to derive utility from consumption and 
from their leisure. The preferences of each member of generation t are given by:     
 
  Ut = 1
1
1
1
11
1
1
ln
111
1 111
+
−−
+
− +
−
+
−
+
− tttt
IlCC δγβ σρρ
σρρ
     (6) 
 
where Ct denotes period t consumption and lt is period t leisure.3 The budget 
constraint on each member of generation t is: 
 
  ( ) tttttt IlhISC −=++ 1τ        (7) 
 
                                                 
2
 See Moav (2005) for a model that explicitly assumes that parents time is an input in the offspring 
education and for a survey on the validity of this assumption. 
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where St denotes period t savings, satisfying: 
 
  Ct+1 = Rt+1St+1.         (8) 
 
2.3 Optimization 
In each period t each member of generation t chooses Ct, St, lt and τt so as to 
maximize the utility captured by (6), given the values of wt, Rt+1 and It and subject to 
(4), (5), (7), (8), 0 ≤ lt ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ τt ≤ 1. By standard optimization the first order 
conditions for an optimum lead to: 
 
ρ
ρ
γ
σ
ρ
tt
t
lIC =                     (9)
   
ρ
ρρρ
γ
β σ
ρ
ttt
t
lIRS
1
1
−
+=                            (10) 
 
and to a the relation between the optimal levels of lt  and τt which is given by: 
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where  l* ≡ 
σ
δ
γ






ab
h
and l**≡ ( )
σ
δ
γ



 +
ab
bh 1
.  (11) does not imply that the optimal τt is 
independent of potential income, It. The optimal τt is positively related to It via the 
positive relation (11) reveals between the optimal levels of τt and lt, taken together 
with the positive relation between the optimal lt and It, a relation that will be 
established next. 
 Applying (9), (10) and (11) in (7) yields:  
 
( ) ( ) 011 1
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(12) presents lt as an implicit function of It and Rt+1. Standard differentiation of 
the LHS of (12) shows that it is increasing in lt. In addition, the RHS of (12) equals -1 
when lt = 0 and equal to the positive term ( )tt
t
t l
I
R
τ
γ
β
ρρ
ρρ
+
+
−
−
+
1
1
11
 when lt = 1. Thus, 
given It and Rt+1, there is a single level of lt in the interval [0,1] that solves (12).  
By implicit differentiation of (12) the optimal level of lt satisfies: 
 
t
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By (11), the denominator of (13) is positive. Thus 
t
t
dI
dl
> 0, making leisure a 
normal good in the sense that it depends positively on potential income, can occur if 
and only if ρ < 1, an assumption that is taken henceforth.  
 
2.4 Dynamics 
In this section the equilibrium dynamics of the economy are presented using the two-
dimensional first order system (kt, lt). Based on the previous sections, if the set 
( ){ }∞=0, ttt lk  is obtained then the set { }
∞
=+ 01 ,,,,,, tttttttt RwSCLK τ  of the other model 
variables is obtained too.  
 At each period t-1 two stocks are created and handed over time to period t: the 
stock of physical capital Kt and a stock of human capital captured by τt-1. The values 
of these stocks in period 0, namely K0 and τ-1, impose a restriction on the possibilities 
for (k0, l0). This restriction determines (k0, l0) and determines thus the entire path the 
economy takes from then on. Specifically this restriction is based upon: 
 
( )( )abl
K
L
Kk
10
0
0
0
0 11 −+−
=≡
τ
                (14) 
   
kt+1 can be presented as a function of (kt, lt) by applying (3), evaluated at t+1, in (12) 
and simplifying, which yields: 
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where It is a function of kt through (2) and (5) and τt(lt) is based on (11). To present 
lt+1 as a function of (kt, lt) note that: 
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where the third equality follows from (10). Simplifying (16) yields: 
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where Rt+1 is a function of kt+1 through (3), kt+1 is a function of (kt, lt) through (16), It 
is a function of kt through (2) and (5) and τt(lt) is based on (11). 
 A further general analysis of the dynamics is technically complicated so the 
main results of this article will be presented through a numerical analysis.  
 
3. Results 
This section looks at two countries identical in all parameters and initial condition, 
except for a difference in their levels of γ. The analysis shows a dynamic pattern in 
which in both countries the individual's leisure time is increasing over time and the 
identity of the country with the lower leisure time is changing over time. Let the two 
countries names be A and B and their levels of γ be denoted by γA and γB, 
respectively. In both countries the other parameters of the model are: A=4, α=0.49, 
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δ=0.5, ρ=0.2, σ=0.4, a=0.9, b=6, h=0.15, β=0.9, K0=0.1 and τ-1=0. Country A's level 
of γ is γA=0.5 and country B's level of γ is γB=0.3.  
 In both countries' cases, a numerical analysis along the constraint that K0 and 
τ
-1 impose on (k0, l0) through (14) reveals that each country has a single path that can 
be consistent with rational expectations.4 The two paths are presented in figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Leisure over time in countries A and B.  
 
As the figure shows, each path is leading its country to its unique steady state point, 
where country A's higher γ sets it on a path that leads to a steady state with more 
leisure than in the steady state to which country B converges. In addition, country A's 
higher γ make its individuals enjoy more leisure than the country B individuals at the 
initial periods of this scenario too. However, their lower level of γ, which imply more 
labor, makes country B individuals richer than those in A and at a certain stage this 
income difference make them enjoy more leisure than the country A individuals. This 
                                                 
4
 All the other paths consistent with (14) lead to either a negative value of lt or a negative value of kt. 
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stage vanishes eventually because diminishing returns to investment in physical and 
human capital make the income gap lose its dominancy over the preference difference 
in determining which country's individuals enjoy more leisure. Figure 4 shows the 
path that the potential income, It, takes over time in each country. 
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Figure 4: Potential income over time in countries A and B.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This article has presented a model that looks at two economies identical in all initial 
conditions and all parameters except for one. Yet, this single difference has turned out 
to succeed in generating an intricate dynamic pattern with several important features. 
Specifically, it was assumed that the weight that the individuals in one of the 
countries ("country A") are assigning a greater wealth to leisure in their utility, 
compared to the weight of leisure in the other country ("country B"). In the resulting 
dynamics, due to this single difference: (i) country A experiences a slower GDP 
growth compared to country B; (ii) Physical capital accumulation in A is slower than 
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in B; (iii) human capital accumulation in A is slower than in B; (iv) at first, because of 
their lower income and despite their stronger preference for leisure – country A 
individuals work more than those in B; (v) later, as income in country A becomes 
sufficiently large, their stronger preference for leisure makes country A individuals 
work less than those in B. All of these characteristics of these dynamics are observed 
when comparing the U.S. to the main European countries over the past five decades. 
The success of a single element to generate a dynamic pattern with so many 
characteristics of the actual data suggests that an explanation based on it might have a 
significant contribution to the already existing explanations for the joint dynamics of 
working hours in the U.S. and Europe. 
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